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I A Mathematic:al Proof of Duverger's Law Thomas R. Pa(frey 
It is not just coincidence that Duverger's Law has established itself as 
one of the premier empirical regularities in political science. With only 
minor caveats,1 it is not only a stylized fact, but also a well-documented 
fact2 that single-1nember-district electoral systems in 'Nhich winners are 
decided by simple plurality rule usually produce two-party systems. It is, 
as far as I know, the only such regularity in political science that is 
widely referred to as a "law." 
What seen1s surprising, and what motivates this essay, is that in 
spite of the revolutionary ascent of formal modeling to the forefront of 
political theory methodology, this clear empirical regularity which has 
extremely intuitive informal explanations see1ns to have miraculously 
escaped the grips of an unambiguous mathematical theorem. If it is as 
true a law as 1nany seem to believe, then there should be a simple 
theoretical explanation for it that formalizes the informal stories and 
rationalizations that have been repeatedly offered for over a century. I 
hope this would also help identify and illuminate the rare circumstances 
in which departures from the most sweeping versions of the law might be 
California Institute of Technology. The author would like to thank the National 
Science Foundation for financial support. This paper was prepared for delivery at the 
Economic Theories of Politics conference in Haifa, Israel, June, 1988, and has benefited 
from discussions with Bruce Cain, John Ledyard, and Richard McKdvey. 
1. The most wdl-known exception is Canada, where provincial party systems are 
bipartisan, but not all provinces have the same two dominant parties. This produces a 
patchwork national party system that is a conglomeration of strong r'egional parties, but in 
which there are still two dominant national parties. The only contradiction to the law here 
is that the minor parties do not con1pletely disappear. Apparently, and not surprisingly, 
parties that have heavily concentrated local support can compete for national office in 
their regions. It is very important to note, however, that within those regions the local 
party systems tend to be bipartisan. Furthermore, only the two major parties (the Tories 
and the Liberals) have controlled the national government. A second exception is India 
(see Weiner 1957), where there is only one dominant party, but third parties seem to be 
able to survive. Riker (1976b) argues that this can happen when historical circumstances 
produce a consensus party that is centrally located on the political spectrum and has wide 
popular appeal: the Congress Party of India. 
2. Sec Rae (1971) and many of the references in Riker's (1982b) excellent survey of 
Duverger's Law. 
69 
L 
7 0  Models o f  Strategic Choice i n  Politics 
expected. This essay offers such a model that explains Duverger's Law 
and indicates some unusual circumstances in which the law might not 
hold up. 
What do all the informal explanations have in common? We are 
fortunate that Riker (1982b) has already collected many of these, so I 
will give only a few representative examples. One of the earliest is 
presented by Droop (1869) who says that unpopular parties do not 
receive votes because voters do not want to waste their votes: 
Each elector has practically a choice between two candidates or sets of 
candidates .... (1')he electors usually find out that their votes will be 
thrown away, unless given in favor of one or the other of the parties 
between whom the election really lies. 
This is a remarkable statement that is really a claim about equilibrium 
behavior of rational voters. It says that voters are making calculating 
decisions that weigh the chances of affecting the outcome given how 
other voters vote. It states that strategic voting is rational behavior, that 
voters arc rational and do this, and that it results in a stable equilibrium 
configuration with only two parties. Thus voters are not only rational in 
his explanation, but they have rational expectations. His early conjec­
ture about this type of strategic voting has been widely confirmed.3 
Earlier this century, Schattschneider (1942, 82) stated: 
(P)eople who vote for minor opposition parties waste their votes. All who 
oppose the party in power are made to feel a certain need for concentrating 
their support behind the party most likely to lead a successful opposition. 
A s a consequence, the tendency to support minor parties is checked. The 
tendency of the single-1ne1nber district system to give the second major 
party a great advantage over all minor parties is extremely important. In 
this way it is possible to explain the longevity of the major parties and the
instability of the minor parties. (Emphasis as in original) 
These two explanations coincide almost exactly with what Duverger 
(1951, 226) himself called the "psychological factor" leading to two domi­
nant parties: 
In cases where there are three parties operating under the simple majority 
single-ballot system the electors soon realize that their votes are wasted if 
they continue to give them to the third party: hence their natural tendency 
3. See, for example, Cain (1978), Duverger (1950), Bense\ and Sanders (1979), 
Spafford ( 1972), and others. 
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to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries in order to 
prevent the success of the greater evil. 
Duverger's psychological factor is then, quite simply, rational strategic 
voting. 
There have been two different formal theoretical approaches which 
have begun to address the question of what is the stable number of 
parties in a winner-take-all system. Both approaches are innovative and 
move a step beyond the standard Downsian models of electoral competi­
tion by opening up the possibility of multiparty equilibria. 
The first approach captures the aspect of multicandidate competi­
tion for a single seat that is the focus of traditional explanations for 
Duverger's Law. VVith more than two candidates, voters have a signifiM 
cantly more difficult decision problem, since they may be better off 
voting for a candRdate other than their first choice, if it appears that their 
first choice stands ino realistic chance of victory. 4 This is the direction we 
pursue here. 
The first atternpt to formalize this connection bet\veen Duvergcr's 
Law and rational voting behavior appears in Riker (1976). Ironically, a 
major point of that essay is to construct a theoretical model that can 
explain the experience in India with persistent third parties, what Riker 
(1976, 94) refers to (perhaps overenthusiastically) as "an egregious ex­
ception" to Duverger's Law.s Cox (1987) adopts a similar approach but 
embeds the strategic decision making by voters into a p1robabilistic equi­
librium model based on the theory of Bayesian games. (Ledyard 1981, 
1984). He shows that the only circumstances in which strategic voting 
might lead voters to abandon their most preferred candidate is if their 
second most preferred candidate is expected to receive more votes. 
However, even that is not a sufficient condition for strategic voting. He 
uses this result to show that there will be a marginal effect of strategic 
voting to help candidates who are expected to do vvell and to hurt 
candidates who are expected to do less well. 
This essay obtains a much stronger result. Using the same basic 
model of voter decision making as Ledyard (1981) andl Cox (1987), we 
show that when the number of voters in the electorate is large, the 
4. In fact, this i�; not only true for single-member district simple-plurality rule sys­
tems, but for most other multicandidate rules as well. Cumulative voting, proportional 
representation, the Borda count, the Hare system, and virtually any other method have 
this difficulty. For a general statement about the widespread problems of eliciting "sin­
cere" behavior, see Gibbard (1973). 
5. As we will show later in the essay, this "egregious exception" is in fact a theoreti­
cally predicted exceptional case: the proverbial exception that proves the rule. 
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equilibrium share of the "third-party vote" must necessarily be small. 
Moreover, this equilibrium share of the vote declines to zero in the limit 
as the size of the electorate grows. This result is true under very general 
assumptions about the heterogeneity and distribution of voter prefer­
ences over candidates, and the total number of candidates in the elec­
tion, and possibilities for abstention. 
The necessity of examining large electorates seems reasonable, if 
one interprets Duverger's Law as describing a property of national 
electoral systems. In fact, Riker argues that a large electorate should 
be included as one of the conditions for plurality voting to have such a 
forceful impact on the party systems (1982b, 755). It is this essay's 
focus on the asymptotic properties of strategic voting that enables this 
stronger result to be obtained. 
The second of these approaches (Brams and Straffin 1982; Palfrey 
1984) is quite different and brings in dynamic, intertemporal factors by 
investigating whether two established parties will be able to adopt issue 
positions to preempt the successful entry of any third party. Palfrey 
(1984) shows in a simple one-dimensional spatial model that an equilib­
rium configuration of the two established parties in a winner-take-all 
system (when it exists) will have one leftist party and one party right of 
center, which are jointly situated so that no third party can enter the 
competition and win. The intuition is that by positioning themselves 
neither too close together nor too extreme, the two established parties 
are located so that there is no "room" for an entrant. Thus, given two 
established parties, additional parties are not viable.6 The weakness of 
this approach is that it assumes no strategic voting. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the 
model of three-candidate elections, following the assumptions of Cox 
(1987). Section III proves the central result of the essay, that in equilib­
rium, the share of the vote for the third party declines to zero as the 
number of voters increases. Section IV explores the extent to which 
these results generalize when candidates are free to select platforms, as 
opposed to when the distribution of voter preferences over candidates is 
exogenously fixed. 
6. A related model is analyzed by Greenberg and Shepslc (1987). They define an 
axiomatic notion of stability that is somewhat different from the noncooperative game­
theoretic equilibrium used in Palfrey (1984), but that retains the basic idea that established 
parties are situated in a way that deters entry of new parties. However, they apply their 
stability notion to election systems with multiple member districts, not winner-take-all 
systems. 
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II. The Model 
There are three candidates, A, B, C. There are n voters. J;ach voter has a 
(strict) preference ranking over the three candidates and we represent a 
voter's preferences for each candidate by a Von Neumann-Morgenstern 
utility number. These utilities are normalized so that voter i receives a 
utility of 1 if his (or her) first choice wins, a utility of 0 for his least 
preferred candidate and a utility of vi for his middle-ranked candidate. 
The distribution of voter preferences is represented by < qAB• q AC• q BA, q BC• 
qcA' qc8 >and < F�.(·) FAcO, F8A(-), Fsc(·), FcA(·), Fe.( ·)>. 
Each q;; equals the probability a randomly selected voter ranks
candidate i first and j second, or alternatively, the average frequency of 
each possible preference ranking in the electorate. We assume each 
voter's preference is independently drawn from this distribution. A 
voter who ranks i first and j second is henceforth referred to as an ij­
type. Below, we n1ake two assun1ptions about the distribution. That 
these assumptions are relatively innocuous is argued later in the essay. 
ASSUMPTION 1. % > 0 for all i,j � A,B,C.
In other words, we assume that every ranking of the;: candidates can 
occur (but, possibly, with very low frequency). Each F;1() is the cun1ula­
tive distribution function (cdf) of Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility 
values of j (the se•::ond-ranked candidate) for a randomly selected ij� 
type. An ij-type who values j at v will be called an ij-v-type. 
AssuMPTION 2 . For all i,j,Fij(' ) is twice continuous�y differentiable,
where, 
F,1(0) � 0 
F,i(l) � 1 
f,1( v) = F!,( v) > 0 for all ve[O,l ].
Assumption 2 rules out mass points of voters and assumes that the 
probability that two randomly selected voters will have exactly the same 
ranking and exactly the same "intensity of preference" ( v) is negligible. 
Finally, we assu1ne that each voter's preferences are independently 
drawn from the probability distribution given 
Now that we have specified voter preferences, we can specify the 
voting game. Each voter simultaneously chooses one of the candidates 
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to vote for, taking as given the voting strategies of other voters, in order 
to maximize the expected utility of the outcome of the election. Recall 
that since we arc talking about election of a single candidate, ties will 
have to be broken if two (or all three) candidates tie for the most votes 
received. How these tics are broken does not affect the results in section 
III, so we will simply assume that tics are broken alphabetically (e.g., A 
beats B in a tiebreaker). 
Each voter knows only his own preferences between A ,B, and C 
and that the other voters are independently distributed according to P. 
Therefore, a voter views the strategies of the other voters as functions 
that specify what each other voter would do for every type he might be. 
We can represent such a strategy for one voter as a measurable function 
O";: {AB,AC,BA,BC,CA,CB} x [0,1]-> {A,B,C}. 
To simplify the proofs, we will only investigate properties of "sym­
metric" equilibria. In other words, we will investigate stable behavior in 
which only two identical voters will make identical voting decisions. This 
restriction enables us to suppress the i-index on <r. Therefore, a voter 
views the strategy of each other voter as the same function <r. This 
symmetry assumption could be dispensed with, but it would be at consid­
erable cost in notation. 
The careful reader will have also noticed by now that we assume all 
voters vote. Thus, in contrast to Ledyard (1981) or Palfrey and Rosen­
thal (1985) we do not consider the possibility of abstentions. 
So far, we have accumulated a number of assumptions that poten­
tially might restrict the scope of the theorem. Summarizing, these are: 
1. All preference types are possible.
2. Distribution of preferences has no mass points.
3. Voter preferences are independent.
4. No abstention.
5. Symmetric equilibrium.
We will discuss relaxing these assumptions later in the essay. 
Let DA• DB, and De, denote the set of voter types who vote for A, B, 
or C, respectively under <r. The probability a randomly selected other 
voter will vote for A, B, or C, is denoted 1TA, 7T8, or 7T0 respectively 
where 1TA + 7T8 + 1Tc = 1 and1Ti � 0 Vj. Then 1Ti is the probability that a
randomly selected voter other than i has a type in D1• For shorthand, we 
can denote a strategy <T =(DA, DB, De). 
Given (DA, DB, De) and (?TA, ?TB, ?Tc), voter i adopts a strategy to 
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AB-v-type voter. Optimal strategies against (DA• DB, Dc)-"best re­
sponses"-for other types of voters are similar. 
Finally, we assume no one votes for the candidate:::� ranked last in 
preference. Thus, ain AB voter never votes for C, etc. This is quite reason­
able, as a voter can inever gain by doing so. A strategy that calls for voting 
for one's least preferred candidate would be a weakly donlinated strategy. 
Ruling out weakly dominated strategies is usually considered reasonable, 
and the logic of doing so in the present context is compelling. 7 
The following lemma states that any equilibrium strategy must have 
the property that a voter will vote sincerely (i.e., for his top-ranked 
candidate) for small values of v (i.e., if his second-ranked and third­
ranked candidates both produce relatively low utility levels). A voter 
will only vote insincerely in equilibrium if v is relatively large (i.e., his 
second-ranked candidate is sufficiently close in utility to his top-ranked 
candidate). Furthermore, insincere voting requires that the likelihood of 
switching the outcome from one's worst candidate to one's second­
choice candidate by voting insincerely instead of sincerely exceeds the 
probability that insincere voting switches the outcome from one's most 
preferred candidate to one's least preferred candidate. 
LEMMA 1. If other voters use (DA, D8, De), generating probabilities 
( 1T A• 1T 8, 1Tc) , and if i is a type AB-voter, then i's best response is: 
(i) Vote for A if: 
P�B (1 - v) + P�c > p';;8 v 
(ii) Either vote for A or B if (i) holds with equality. 
(iii) Vote for B if Pcs v > P�B (1 - v) + P�c· 
where 
p�8 = probabiliily that voting for A yields A, but voting for B yields B 
P�c = probabili1ty that voting for A yields A, but voting for B yields C
p�-8 = probability that voting for A yields C, but voting for B yields B. 
7. Exceptions to the "reasonableness" of eliminating dominated strategies seem to 
arise in Prisoners' Dilen1mas and related games where there are clear group gains to 
coordinating behavior. 1n1at is, everyone benefits when everyone adopts a dominated 
strategy. Such gains are not present in the voting game considered here. For further 
discussion of the appropriateness of eliminating dominant strategie:s sec Palfrey and 
Srivastava (1986). 
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These probabilities are computed using trinomial formulas, with parame­
ters 1TA• 1T8, 1Tc, and n. They are derived below:
P�c= probability that out of (n - 1) other voters, a vote for A, 
b vote for B, c vote for C, and b <a= c - 1
= probability{b <a= c -1} 
' l2H (n _ 1)1 " . ( )'( )d'-'(1T )"! "'tc1 k!(k + l)!(n -2k -2)! "A "n c k = ! 3 J 
where [X} is the least integer greater than or equal to X. Similarly, 
and 
Pc•= probability {a < b = c -1}
' 121-1 (n-l)' 'V . ( )•��( )W )Ni � k!(k + l)!(n -2k -2)! "A "• '"c k = [ 3 J 
P�n = probability {a = b 2- c -1} 
+ probability {a= b -1 2- c - 1} 
[n;t\ 
'V __ (�n_-_1�)_! -(1T )' (" )'(" )•-2k-J L.J k!k!(n - 2k - 1)! A B C k=[�]-1 
1tt:f1 -1 
'"\:' (n-l)! k+t n2k2 + 
L.. k!(k + l)!(n-2k-2)!
(1T,)'(1T.) (1Tc)- - . 
k = [�]-1 
Analogous formulas for the voters with other preference orders 
over candidates can also be derived. We say U' is a Symmetric Bayesian­
Nash Equilibrium (or simply Equilibrium) if for every i, u{t,) maximizes 
i's expected utility when i is type ti and when all other voters use the 
strategy O". 
From Lemma 1, if either pij or Pki is positive, we may rewrite the
inequality in (i) as: 
(2) 
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Consequently insincere voting not only requires v to be relatively large, 
but also requires that the voter is more likely to be pivotal between his 
second and last choices than between his first and last choices (p'f.; > p�k).
Therefore, an equilibrium can be written as a set o1f six cut points, 
v: = (v;B, v�c. v�A'· v�c. v�A• v�8), each of which must e:ither equal 1 or
satisfy (2) with equality. A cut point has a convenient and simple inter­
pretation. A voter votes for his second choice if and only if his intensity 
of preference for that second choice (v) is sufficiently high. Inequality 
(2) is a precise statement of what "sufficiently high" means. For some ij­
types, there is no v • (0,1) that is sufficiently high, in which case no voter 
with this order of preference for the candidates will vote strategically. 
This happens for an ij-type when p;k >Pk;-8 
Lemma 1, then, specifies six inequality conditions that must hold at 
an equilibrium. However, this is only a partial description of an equilib­
rium. A further requirement of Bayesian equilibrium is that 1TA, 1T8, and 
1Tc are in fact generated by the voters all adopting the decision rule given 
by the equilibriurr1 cut points. This is sometimes referred to as the "ra­
tional expectations" property of Bayesian equilibrium, because it means 
that if all voters share expectations that other voters vote for A, B, and 
C with probabilities 1TA, 1T8, and 1To then the optimal behavior by voters, 
given these expectations, will produce the expected voting pattern-Le., 
expectations (or !beliefs) are self-fulfilling. This produces three addi­
tional equilibria conditions: 
1TA =qA8FAn(V1n)+qACFAc(V1c) 
+q.A[l - F8A(v�A)]+qcA[l - FcA(vcA)] 
1Tn =qBAFnA(v�A)+qBcFnc(V�c) 
+qA8[1 - FA•(v�.)]+qCB[l - FCB(vc.)l 
7rc =qcAFCA(v�A)+qcnFcn(V�n) 
+qAc[l - FAc(V�c)]+q.c[l - F8c(v�c)] 
Possible Equilibria 
(3A) 
(3B) 
(3C) 
We distinguish between three possible types of equilibria, depending 
upon the configuration of voter strategies. These are: called one-party 
equilibrium, two-party equilibrium, and three-party equilibrium, and are 
defined by the number of parties whose candidate receives a positive 
expected vote. The form of Duverger's Law that we intend to prove is 
that, within the confines of our model, only two-party equilibrium occur. 
8. Cox (1987) has pointed out that one case where this happens is when 7T; > 'Tr;·
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Several observations can now be made about equilibrium with at 
least four voters. First, there will exist an equilibrium. In fact there 
exists at least three equilibria where in each of these equilibria there is 
substantial strategic voting, in the sense that some voters do not vote for 
their first choice. To see this, take any pair of parties, assume all voters 
vote for their preferred one of these two, and consider the implications 
of Lemma 1: A voter should vote for his first choice unless his first 
choice is not one of the two candidates receiving votes, in which case he 
should vote for his second choice. (This argument requires that the 
population of voters be at least four.) This is an equilibrium. 
Next, consider a possible one-party equilibrium in which the candi­
date of one of the parties receives all of the votes. Why is this not an 
equilibrium? The probability of casting a decisive vote is 0, so each voter
is indifferent between voting for any candidate, since his vote cannot 
affect the outcome (assuming the population of voters exceeds two). 
However, for a voter who ranks the unanimous winner last, voting for 
either other candidate is guaranteed to generate at least as high an 
expected utility as voting for the candidate who is expected to get all the 
votes, and, for some (out of equilibrium) configuration of strategies by 
other voters, generates strictly higher expected utility. Thus such equilib­
ria rely on the use of dominated strategies. This eliminates the "unani­
mous" equilibria. 
To summarize, Lemma 1 and the assumption that voters do not use 
dominated strategies together immediately imply that: 
1. There is no equilibriun1 in which only one party's candidate
receives votes.
2. There are three two-party equilibria.
We next turn to the central question of this paper: In large electorates, 
(as n-? oo) will there ever exist any three-party equilibrium? The answer 
is no, except for knife-edge cases. 
111. Strategic Voting with Many Voters 
The objective of this section is to show that in large electorates with 
simple-plurality, single-ballot elections there do not exist any equilibria 
in which all parties are viable. In particular, except for knife-edge cases, 
the only equilibria that can exist in large electorates involve exactly two 
parties with candidates who receive a positive fraction of the vote, if we 
assume voters do not use dominated strategies (i.e., they never vote for 
their last choice). 
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With three candidates and any number of voters, the critical ele­
ment in the voter calculus is the probability of casting a decisive vote, 
and in particular, the relative probabilities of casting a decisive vote 
between one's first and last choices versus one's second and last choices. 
Consequently, the key aspect of "proving" Duverger's Law in large 
electorates involves identifying the asymptotic properties of these proba­
bilities. The following lemma turns out to be very important in establish­
ing these properties: 
LEMMA 2. Assume 1TA <min {1T8,1TJ. Then JLllJ (�·�) = 0.
Pcs 
Proof. The proof consists of a messy formalization of the following 
intuitive argument. Without loss of generality, assume n8 :s:; 7Tc- Thenp�c 
is the probability that the least popular candidate and tlhe "favorite" arc 
tied for the most votes and PCB is the probability that the second most
popular and the favorite are tied for the most votes.9 'Thus P�c I p�8 is
equivalent to the ratio of likelihoods that the least popular candidate is 
tied for victory with the favorite compared to the second most popular 
candidate being tied with the favorite, conditional on one of these two 
ties occurring. The lemma states that with many voters, if some candidate 
ties the favorite it 11vill almost certainly have to be the second rnost popular 
candidate. The implication of this is that if your personal favorite is the 
least popular candidate then, regardless of your relative valuation, v, of 
your second choice, with enough voters in the electorate you will be 
better off voting for your second choice. 
Outline of Formal Proof (Details in Appendix)
For each n, denote by E�c and EC8 the expected winning share of the two 
candidates who receive the most votes, conditional on A and C being 
tied for the most1 or Band C being tied for the most,10 respectively, and 
define E AC = Ji.IlJ E�c and Ec8 = JLllJ EC8• The proof next proceeds
through a series of steps: 
9. Actually, because of the tie-breaking rule, P�c equals the probability that, with 
n - 1 voters, C receives the most votes and A receives one less vote than C; PC8 equals the 
probability that C receives the most votes and B receives one less than C; P�8 equals the 
probability A and B tie for the most votes or B gets one more vote than A. 
10. See note 9. 
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Step 1: Prove that 
EcB = 1TA 2+--- ·-
v 1T111T'c 
_ (n -1)! (7Tn7Tc)Hn-l)Ecnl1Tc7TA!n-2-2f:c8(n-l)J 
p(;B = - ---- ·---·-- -- --- --
((n - l)Eu,]![J+ (n - l)EcnJ![n - 2 - 2 Ecu(n -!)]! 
Prove: 
lim (Vic ) = o n--->"' -n 
PCB
Step 3: 
=O � lim (P�c ) =0 n--->oo 11 
Pen 
These three steps are proved in the appendix and establish the lemma in 
case 1Tc � 1T8. If 1T8 =::: tr0 the entire proof goes through identically with 
the only change being that EAc = 1;1 for all values of ("A• "s• 1Tc), such that
1Tn =:-: 1Tc. 
THEOREM. Fix F. There does not exist a s�quence of equilibria {v:}11: 1 
such that 0 < 1T� < min{7T;, 7T�}, where nt = J!ill 7T/v;:),j = A,B,C, where
1T/v:) is given by equation (3j). 
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Proof Without loss of generality, let 7T; = min{ 7T;,11·�} and hypothe�
size 0 < 1T! < 1r;. Then for some profile, there must exist some
subsequence of {v�], call it {v::J, such that at least one of the following 
limits holds: 
In other words, there must be some region with a positive measure of 
voters who vote for A in the limit. We will now apply Lemma 1 to prove 
that v�8 and v�c 1nust equal 0 and v�A and v�A must equal 1. From
Equation (2), we have 
*"' - p
�'B + !!_';s_:
v AB 
P
iii +p
'" 
AB CB 
P;nf P�� +_p';dP'Cs 
P':.nlP�n + 1 
(Note that for large m p'(l8 > 0, by the hypothesis that 1Tj� > 0 and 'IT'� >
0.) If limits exist, then 
From Lemma 1, each of the limits on the right-hand side of the equation 
above exists and equals 0, so v18 = 0. By the same argument, V�c = 0. 
That v�8 = 1 follows simply from the observation that ii' every voter who 
prefers A to B (and C is last) will never vote for A, then no voter who 
prefers B to A (and C is last) will ever vote for A. Similarly v�A = 1. 
Therefore, "�= 0, a contradiction. (Q.E.D.) 
An alternative statement of the proof is the following. 
THEOREM. Fix F and fix 7TA > 7T8 > 1Tc > 0. Then there is an 
electorate size N such that for all n;;::::: N and for all equilibria {vn*}, 
(1T�(v,;),1T;(vn*),1Ti:(v11*)) ¥= (1TA,1T8,'l'Tc), and 'l'Ti; (v:) < 1Tc·
In other words, the least popular party's equilibrium share of the vote 
must converge to O as the electorate becomes large, if all voters are 
acting strategically. 
---- -- --------------
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Exceptional Cases 
The above theorem does not completely rule out three-party equilibfia 
since there is the possibility that 1TA = min {1T/J,7Tc}· There are two cases 
to consider here. First, if 1T8 = 1To then we must have 1TA = 'TT'n = 1T'c = l/J. 
In this case, for large n, all voters vote for their first choice, since the 
right-hand side of inequality Equation (2) converges to 1. This can be 
sustained as an equilibrium only if qA8 +qAc = q8A + q8c = qcA + qc8, a 
knife-edge case. 
Second, if 1T'11 = 7T0 then 1TA >7r8 = 1Tc- In this case, inspection of
inequality Equation (2) for large n shows that in equilibrium we must 
have all voters voting for their first choice, so such an equilibrium can 
occur in large electorates only if either qAll + qAc = q8A + q8cor qA8 + qAc
= qcA + qcJJor qllA + q8c = qcA + qcw Again, these arc exceptional cases.
The exceptional cases have interesting interpretations. The first 
case, where 1TA = 1T8 = 1Tc = V3 can occur in one of two ways. The 
obvious way it can occur is ruled out by assumption and might arise if all 
voters evaluate all candidates identically. While this may not seem to be 
a likely thing to happen from an empirical standpoint, and it may seem 
intuitively in1plausible, it certainly cannot be ruled out theoretically; in 
fact some recent versions of the Downsian model of candidate competi­
tion make such a theoretical prediction. We return to this in the next 
section. 
This case can also arise if the parties take positions so that voters 
are equally split in their preferences between the parties. While there 
maybe some rare historical instances where this has happened, such 
situations seem inherently unstable because of the delicate balance on 
which exactly equal three-way division hangs. 
The second exceptional case arises when there is one very popular 
party and two ( or more) equally minor parties. Again I would argue that 
is relatively unlikely to happen, but here we do have a specific empirical 
case that seems to fit: India. The discussion in Riker ( 1976b) and some 
of the references he cites support this theoretical explanation quite con­
vincingly. The Congress party is clearly dominant relative to a collection 
of lesser parties, the strongest of which are roughly equal in strength. 
The lesser parties are of significant size and do not disappear, but are 
just too disparate to unify into a single, effective opposition party. 
IV. Extensions and Generalizations 
More Than Three Possible Parties 
The basic idea of the results in the last section was that if exactly three 
parties put up candidates for election when there are many voters, then 
equilibrium voting patterns will end up eliminating exactly one party in 
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the sense that its candidate must receive an order of n1agnitude fewer 
votes than the runner-up. One ( of several) artificial features of the 
model was that only three parties were considered. Suppose m > 3 
parties competed. �rhen is it possible that perhaps more than 2, say m -
1, parties could be viable in equilibria? The answer is no. Two is un­
equivocally special in this regard. Suppose we \>Vanted Ito see if the ex­
pected vote shares, 1TA 2: 1T8 > 1Tc 2: 7T0 2: · · · > 0, in an m-party race 
could possibly be a limit point of equilibrium expected vote shares as the 
number of voters became large. As before, we find ( by a similar argu� 
ment) that the probability of a voter being decisive between A and B will 
become ( in the li1nit) infinitely greater than the probability of a voter 
being decisive between A and any other pair. Thus, in the natural gener­
alization of this model to plurality voting between candidates from m 
parties, Duverger's Law remains intact. 
It is probably instructive to sketch the proof. What has to be shown is 
that in large electorates, equilibrium voting behavior implies that a voter 
will always vote for the most preferred candidate of the tv10 frontrunners. 
To see this, consider a voter with utility v1 for his or her first choice, v2 for 
second, etc., up to vm for his least-preferred candidate .. That is v1 2".: v2 
2::: • • • 2::: vrn. Let vk denote the utility of his first choice among the 
frontrunners ( i.e., k equals either A or B) and let v1 denote the utility of 
his second choice a:mong the frontrunners, and assume vk > v1. u Let j be 
any candidate otheir thank. We can write down a condition analogous to 
inequality Equation (2) that specifies when such a voter is better off 
voting fork thanj. !Using the same notation as before, we get for given n: 
This can be rewritten as: 
11. By assumption vk > v1 for all except a measure zero set of voters. 
----
(2') 
( 2") 
84 Models of Strategic Choice in Politics 
The limiting argument now proceeds in the familiar fashion. Fixing 1Tk 2: 
1T1 > ... > 0, we get p1/;lpk1--;. 0, for all ij -=Jo kl. Thus, the right-hand si<lc
of Equation (2") converges to v1, independently of j. 
Spatial Party Competition 
A natural question to ask is whether the model presented here is consis­
tent with a spatial model of voter behavior. The answer is yes, but with a 
caveat. If the voters are drawn from a continuous distribution of "reason­
able" (say, Euclidean) preferences and parties offer candidates at differ­
ent points in the policy space then the results go through directly. If the 
parties generate candidates over which all voters are indifferent the 
result will be false. Therefore, the caveat is that the theorem applies 
only to differentiated parties. 
Several remarks about this implicit assu1nption that three candi­
dates do not converge are in order. First, even if parties do converge in 
policy space, the results will still go through as long as voters systemati­
cally misperceive the locations of the candidates, or if candidates have 
nonpolicy attributes that distinguish them (age, looks, voice quality, 
ethnic background, regional base, etc.). The failure of the result to hold 
at convergence of candidates is appropriately viewed as a knife-edge 
case. 
Second, this knife-edge feature suggests that the next step to take is 
to embed a game of party competition within the structure of then-party 
voter equilibrium studied here. This would generate a model somewhat 
like Ledyard (1984), with two important exceptions. First, we have three 
candidates, not two. Second, Ledyard allows for abstention. While the 
abstentions arc easy to incorporate, the complications generated by 
more than two candidates are subtle and difficult because of the inevita­
bility of strategic voting. In Ledyard's (1984) model,12 the formal struc­
ture is a two-stage game. The first stage of the game is a simultaneous 
choice of platforms (or nomination of candidates) by each party. In the 
second stage, the voters get to observe (perfectly) these choices by 
candidates but have incomplete information about the preferences of 
the other voters. Voters then choose simultaneously which candidate to 
vote for. The second-stage subgarnes correspond exactly with the analy­
sis in the body of this essay. However, as we pointed out earlier, there 
are multiple voter equilibria in any subgame (i.e., for any location of the 
candidates). These multiple equilibria make the equilibrium behavior in 
12. This is also the case in other models in which candidates and noncandidates are 
both treated as strategic actors (see, for example, Austen-Smith 1987a and Ingberman 
1986, in the context of campaign financing). 
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the first stage of the game essentially indeterminate-i.e., there will be 
many candidate equilibria that can be supported by some configuration 
of voter equilibria in the subgames. (By configuration we 1nean a func­
tion that assigns party platforms into equilibrium voting strategies.) This 
indeterminacy needs 1to be investigated more thoroughly, but such an 
investigation is clearly beyond the scope of this essay. 
The spatial interpretation of the model presented in section II also 
relates to Assumption 1, that all preference orders have positive proba· 
bility. In one din1ension with single-peaked preferences, some prefer· 
ences arc impossible. l�ontheless, the theorem goes through even if q1k = 
0 for some orderings. Similarly, with respect to the details of Assump­
tion 2, it is not necessary that the density function be positi1ve for all v E 
[0,1]. The only imporltant part of Assumption 2 is the requirement that
there be no mass points. 
Abstention 
Any model of voting that explores the implications of rational strategic 
behavior in large electorates is obliged to consider the implications of 
abstention. ll is established by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) using a very 
siinilar Bayesian gan1t� approach that in large electorates rational voters 
with positive net costs of voting will not turn out, This means, simply, 
that we must restrict analysis to the portion of the electorate who have 
nonpositive net costs of voting. There are many reasons vvhy net costs 
may not be positive: consumption value from voting, feelings of citizen 
duty or obligation, fear of reprisals or sanctions for not voting (badger· 
ing by spouse, union official, friends, party activists), to name a few that 
are often suggested. In fact, as long as any strictly positive fraction of the 
electorate has nonpositive net costs of voting, and therefore vote) all of 
the results of the essay hold. 
In an extreme case, if all voters were to have strictly positive net 
voting costs then the prediction would be that nearly 0 percent turnout 
would occur with large elections. While this will undoubtedly change the 
theorems in this essay (I have not worked out the details), the implica­
tion of no turnout is vvildly out of sync with the significant numbers we 
observe voting. 
Dynamics 
The results in this essay have been interpreted as implying that if three 
parties are competing in a single-ballot winner-take-all system, eventu­
ally (i.e., in an equillibrium) one of the parties will be weeded out. 
However, the model is static, even though the interpretation has dy­
namic overtones. A dynamic model would probably serve two very use-
86 Models of Strategic Choice in Politics 
ful purposes here. First, the equilibrium expectations of voters, which 
drive their equilibrium voting decisions in multicandidate elections do 
not emerge from thin air. These expectations are the product of past 
electoral outcomes, polls, media commentary, and other factors. Polls, 
past outcomes, etc. themselves are endogenously a function of voters' 
expectations and decisions. This suggests that it would make more sense 
from a standpoint of realism to explicitly model expectations and strate­
gies as evolving over time. (For examples of this approach in dynamic 
economic models, see Marcet and Sargent 1985 and Woodford 1986.) 
The second potential contribution of a dynamic model would be to 
lead toward a resolution of the indeterminacy of multiple equilibria in 
the static model. The static model in this essay went a long way in this 
regard, by essentially eliminating all equilibria in the voting game except 
for two-party equilibria. However, there are still (at least three) multiple 
two-party voter equilibria, and these in turn produce a plethora of equi­
libria in the larger game of party competition, as argued above. A well­
formulated model of the dynamics of the formation of expectations and 
beliefs about when a party is a "viable" one (worth expending one's vote 
on) might shed some light on the indeterminacy issue. 
Other Electoral Systems 
The original statement of Duverger's Law actually has more compo­
nents than the one examined here. In fact, Duverger asserts a partial 
converse (which he does not refer to as a "law") of the result proved 
here, that "the single-majority systems with second ballot and propor­
tional representation favor multi-partisan" ( 1951, 2 39). This presents 
some new problems from a theoretical standpoint, as the modeling of 
proportional representation systems is much harder because of more of 
a need to explicitly study the coalition formation process . This is not to 
say that in simple majority, single-ballot, non-PR systems, the coalition 
formation process among legislators is inconsequential. In fact, this is an 
aspect of the problem we have glossed over in this essay. Usually a party 
runs a slate of candidates, often across a range of political ·"districts'' to 
produce a legislature as a concoction of regional winners. The represen­
tative system modeled in this paper consisted of but a single "at large" 
district with a single representative. 
Duverger claims that an additional (beside strategic voting) reinforc­
ing feature in preventing more than two parties is the underrepresen­
tation of small parties (share of seats much less than share of votes) that 
results as a consequence of single-ballot winner-take-all elections at the 
district level. Since this "mechanical" (Duverger 1951, 2 2 6)  factor would 
seem to reinforce the strategic voting factor analyzed in this essay, its 
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absence from the model does not seem to detract significa1t1tly from the 
results. 
On the other hand, the entire notion of PR makes little sense at all 
in the context of electing a one-member government. The fact that a 
party can win some seats with less than a majority only m.akes sense if 
there are several seats up for grabs. Thus any model of PR will require a 
model of multimembcr assemblies. This is a more difficult issue. There 
are many variations on PR and majority-based electoral systems, as well 
as completely different types of systems (approval voting, cumulative 
voting, etc.) for whiclh the implications of strategic voting are not well 
understood. 
APPENDIX 
Proof of Step 1 of Lemma 2. This problem is equivalent to the following 
one. A total of n balls are drawn with replacement from an urn contain­
ing a large number of red balls, white balls, and green balls that occur 
with frequencies 0 <p1 < p2 � p3, respectively. Let X,, 13 denote the ran­
dom variable taking on values between �and V2 equal to the proportion
of red balls conditional on exactly k red balls being drawn, exactly (k + 
1) green balls being drawn, and exactly (n - 2k - 2 )  white balls being
drawn from a sample of n - 1 balls and k 2" (n - 1)/3. Then 
Think of the red balls as being votes for A, the green balls as being votes 
for C, and the white baits as being votes for B. 
Standard results !in probability theory tell us that the distribution of 
X,,13 is asymptotically normal. Therefore, since in our problem pf?,' is 
unimodal in k for each n and that mode converges to a limit, then the 
limit of the modes must equal £13•
The limit of the modes is simple to compute because X,, 13 has a
distribution similar to a binomial. In particular, 
P
-kn = 
13 
P,,, 13
88 Models of Strategic Choice in Politics 
where 
P,,, 13 
n-1 n i = [-3-], · · · ,12] - L 
Therefore, pt; is unimodal ink if and only if Pt3' is unimodal ink .  To see
thatp7;1is unimodal look at first differences, Llp7; = p��' - Jli31n. This gives
LI '"= [\n -2k )(n -2k-l) (f!_,P3) 1] (n -1)! H ,,-2k 1 p13 k (k + 1) Pi - (k - l)!k!(n -2k )'p1 p, P 3•
p,p3 
> 
k (k +I)
(p2)2 (n -2k )(n -2k - 1) 
Rewriting this expression using the notation of the lemma, we get p!'� is 
increasing if 
7r_A_7r_ c 
> 
k (k .+ __ 1_,) _ _ 
(7r8)2 ( n - 2k )( n -2k - l)
The right-hand side is strictly increasing ink, so ft!'�- is unimodal ink, as 
desired. If the mode is interior to (V:i, V2), then for large n, it occurs at k
which approximates 
or 
k' 
(n -2k )2 
'."A 7r C = _____(j<l_n)'_____ 
"'1 11 - 2 (k In)]' . 
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Solving, gives 
Since kin is constrained to be at least VJ, we must have 
k 
n 
for 7Tii > 1T A 7T c· Consequently, we get
An identical argun1ent proves that Ec8 = 2 + 1T A/��because 1T� <1Tn1Tc by hypothesis. (Recall 1TA < 1Tn ::-::; 1Tc) 
Proof of Step 2 of Lemma 2: Let 
( - [)I ( )[(n-J)£Ac[ n-2-2[(,,-l)EAcJ= n · 1Tn1Tc 1Tc1TA 
p�"=l(n - l)EAcJ!(l + i(n - l)EAcJ)!(n -2 -2l(n _: l)EAcJ)!.
Then 
[ ::J+J[EAc{n-l)J-(11-l) 
which, for large n is bounded above by 1. By construction, P'Cn < P'C8, 
and it is easy to show that 
�, 
Pen converges to 0,
P'Cn 
�������--------------------------.... -------------·--------...... �---·���----
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so: 
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lim P�c; = Iim ( P�c ) ( µ; .• ) 
11-v,;, -11 II-">"� -11 -11 Pen Pen Pen 
0. 
Proof of Step 3 of Lemma 2. The central limit theorem insures that 
for any e > 0, P�c(e) and P�·n(E) converge to P�c and p�,8 in the sense that
li.'1J(JJ�c (e)/p�c) = I, and jiru(p�8(e)!p�11) = I, where 
Since E Ac and Ec n are both strictly less than lh, we may choose e so that
n -I n-1 
(-2-) -[ (n  -l)(EAC + e) ]and
(-2-) -[(n - l) (Ern + e)] 
both diverge to oo in the limit. Since Ec n is strictly greater than V3, e can
also be chosen so that 
n -1 
[ (n - l) (Ec 11 - e) ] --3-
diverges to oo in the limit. Therefore, we may rewrite P�c (e) and p��8(e) 
for n sufficiently large and e sufficiently small as: 
[{11 - l)(EAc + F)] (n 1)' 
P'A' c.·(e) = " 
- . (n1', ..-iH k+15)£_, k!(k + J) !(� - 2k - 2)! A'TrB 'Ire k k""" [(11 -l)(EAc -f)] 
[(11-l)(Ecn+dl (n-1) ! ,,_21_2 1 k+I p'� . (e) = L k!(k+l) !(n-2k-2)! ("'A "'•"'c )k � 1(11 -l)(Ecn -,·)I 
where 
. n -- 1 a, = o 1t k < --
3 
. n -· 1 
= l 1f k""---. 3 
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For each n both of these sums contain equal numbers of terms that can 
be matched up. For given n, call the terms on the right-hand side of the 
P�c(E) equation a1, • • •  , a111n and the terms on the right�hand side of the
P'C�(c) equation b1, • • •  , b111,,. By construction, we have Jim a1/b1 
= O 
uniformly in l. We allso have 
but 
,!Liu �.-..'...+
am 
bl+ ... + bmn 
q�� ::s max!!_]_ . bl+ ... bmn 1-srnn bl 
Since �� 0 uniform.ly, we get
Therefore 
lim P�f = O 1'--->'° II • Pen 
� 0.
